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Summary 
 
The approach of the NZFSA has been one of sustained misinformation. The outcome has been a 
major failure to objectively assess food safety issues for at-risk individuals.  
 
Since at least 2002 NZFSA has had a stance that ‘all milk is safe’.  Consistent with this, the 
starting strategy for the 2003/2004 investigation into A1 and A2 milk was to ‘deal with 
maintaining drinking milk’ 
 
The NZFSA sought a report from Professor Swinburn that was authoritative.  The proposed 
outcome was that ‘at the end, [we] can say we have checked’.  However, there was a fundamental 
flaw in the NZFSA approach because the expected outcome was essentially predetermined.   
 
The NZFSA then provided guidance to Professor Swinburn that the term ‘precautionary 
principle’, as it is normally understood, was to be avoided. 
 
Throughout the review process the relationship between NZFSA and Fonterra was informal.  It 
included advice from Fonterra as well as lobbying by Fonterra as to how the report should be 
used.  In contrast, the relationship with A2 Corporation was more formal.   
 
A2 Corporation was unsuccessful in widening the scope of the review to include any of the 
underlying science, information in patent applications, and unpublished documentation from 
within Fonterra. 
 
NZFSA’s communication strategy included a press release that was ‘authoritative’ in style and 
with a key message that ‘there is no evidence that either milk poses a food safety issue’. 
 
However, the report that Professor Swinburn produced did not provide a message that ‘all milk 
was safe’.  Swinburn has subsequently been explicit that he purposefully avoided such a phrase.  
Indeed the message was totally contradictory of statements by Swinburn that the A1/A2 health 
issue was ‘potentially very important for population health’. 
 
For NZFSA to successfully communicate a message of certainty (‘all milk is safe’), two issues 
then needed to be dealt with. One was that the Lay Summary could not be released at the same 
time. This was because the Swinburn message of uncertainty was particularly explicit in this Lay 
Summary.  
 
The second issue was that it would be counter productive if Swinburn were available to talk to 
the media at the time the report was released.  This was because his message of uncertainty 
would have been elicited by media questions. 
 
The decision making processes that led to exclusion of the Lay Summary and release of the 
technical report at a time when Professor Swinburn had said he was not available, remain opaque.  
It is clear that some relevant information has not been provided as required under the OIA.  
However, some discussions may have been held without written documentation. 
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It is clear that NZFSA has made contradictory statements about the initial non release of the Lay 
Summary.  What is not clear is which of their statements is true. Carol Barnao’s written statement 
that it was excluded ‘as we feel that the tone is inconsistent with the substantive report’ is 
illuminating.   There was indeed a difference in tone between the technical report and the Lay 
Summary, and it arose from the difference in the audiences.  In the technical report Swinburn was 
addressing the issue of whether ‘ordinary milk’ should have a health warning on it and he was 
clear that the level of uncertainty was far too high for such an action.  However, in the Lay 
Summary he was speaking to ordinary people about the measures they might wish to take as 
individuals, given that level of uncertainty.   
 
NZFSA have said that their decision to release the report when Professor Swinburn had stated his 
unavailability was made in error.  However, even allowing for this confusion, NZFSA have 
stated that they deliberately chose not to delay the report for a few days until they knew Swinburn 
would be available in NZ.   
 
It is notable that NZFSA did nothing to subsequently bring their ‘key message’ in line with 
Professor Swinburn’s position.  When Swinburn expressed his disappointment to them they tried 
to justify their stance and re-asserted their previous position. 
 
The NZFSA response to Woodford’s book (Sept 2007) provided further clear evidence that 
NZFSA had ‘bunkered down’ and was in a state of denial.  NZFSA stated in a press release on 13 
September 2007, that ‘media reports of issues with milk, based on a book release, are not backed 
by scientific evidence’.  However, they also admitted at that time, in response to questions, that 
they had not seen the book.  On ‘Close-Up’ (13 Sept) Carole Inkster said that Professor Swinburn 
would have kept them informed if there had been new evidence.  However, Swinburn had no 
such contract and he has stated hat he has not been working in this field in recent years. 
 
The NZFSA also said that “We understand that this new book…is not presenting new science but 
is continuing to consider the material that was available to Professor Swinburn.  The reality was 
that Professor Swinburn considered 38 papers whereas Woodford’s book considers more than 
100.   
 
One can only surmise as to the motivations that have led to the NZFSA behaviours, and whether 
they arise from incompetence or something else.  It would seen that at an early stage NZFSA 
chose to characterise the A2 issue as an attack on milk in general , rather than an opportunity to 
deal with some particular problems that were solvable through animal breeding.  It may be that 
NZFSA did not appreciate that there were already in the order of one million A2 cows in NZ, that 
no company can own the A2 gene, and that any farmer can produce and any company can sell 
milk that is free of A1 beta casein. 
 
There is a subtle but extremely important distinction between the stance of NZFSA and Food 
Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ). (NZFSA is the NZ implementing agency for 
FSANZ.)  On 14 Sept 2007 FSANZ produced a new ‘fact sheet’ for A1 and A2 milk, stating 
‘FSANZ recommends that milk should continue to be regarded as a safe and nutritious 
component of the diet for most people’. [Italics added.].  This has received no publicity in NZ. 
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The A1/A2 saga also highlights generic issues as to whether the structure and culture within 
NZFSA is fundamentally flawed.  According to NZFSA’s own website;  
‘The New Zealand Food Safety Authority has two key functions:  
-to protect and promote public health and safety 
-to facilitate market access for New Zealand’s food and food-related products.’ 
This structure makes it very easy for NZFSA to have a confused mandate.   
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Background and Purpose 
 
The NZFSA claims (24 Sept 07) that they do not believe ‘A1 milk is any more or less of a risk 
than A2 milk’.  Presumably they are basing this claim on the report undertaken for them by 
Professor Boyd Swinburn in 2004, which is the only external review they have undertaken.  Both 
the NZFSA position and the Swinburn Report can be accessed from their website 
(www.nzfsa.govt.nz). 
 
The NZFSA also claims that the recent book, “Devil in the Milk”, written by the author of this 
report, has presented no new evidence that would cause them to change their position. 
 
The purpose of this report is therefore to review whether or not the NZFSA position is consistent 
with the professional advice that they have received, and to analyse the processes that have led to 
any discrepancies between their position and this professional advice. 
 
The report also addresses whether their current stated position regarding no further evidence 
being available is consistent with the facts, and how they have come to this conclusion. 
 
Leading from this, the report analyses the behaviours that have led to the discrepancies that are 
found, and explores whether there are fundamental problems at NZFSA both in relation to the 
specific issue of A1/A2 milk and the generic issue of structure and culture within the NZFSA. 
 
 
Information Sources 
 
This report draws on four key data sets 
1. Information from the NZFSA website including NZFSA press releases 
2. Information obtained from the NZFSA as a consequence of a request by the author of this 
report under the Official Information Act (OIA), relating to internal and external 
correspondence relevant to the Swinburn Report on A1 and A2 milk, and for the calendar 
years 2003 and 2004.. 
3. Information provided by NZFSA to NZ Farmers Weekly under the OIA in March 2004. 
4. Correspondence from the NZFSA to the author of this report. 
 
The information obtained by this author under the OIA was supplied on 28 Sept 2007 in response 
to a request made on 24 July 2007.   
 
There is a requirement under the OIA for material to be provided within 20 working days of a 
request, unless there are unavoidable delays, in which case a plan for supplying the information is 
to be provided.  The relevant Act and the office of the Ombudsman make it clear that responding 
to such requests is to be regarded as ‘core business’ and delays based on other staff commitments 
are not valid. 
 
In this particular case, an official of the NZFSA finally advised orally on 12 Sept 2007 that the 
material had been collated but required ‘signoff’ from Policy Director Carole Inkster as to what 
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could be released and what would have to be withheld on various grounds.  This then took 
another 11 days due to a ‘lack of availability of the authorising Director’.1 The total time was 47 
days. 
 
Various information was then withheld (and remains currently unavailable) on three grounds.   
 
One was privacy under Section 9(2)(a) of the Act.  There were 187 exclusions on this ground, 
including identification of various industry officials from Fonterra and A2 Corporation who 
wrote in their official positions.  In the case of A2 Corporation it was possible to identify the 
officials because their official position was in general noted below the withheld official’s name.  
However, in the case of the Fonterra officials, this identification of official position was not 
possible beyond identifying that the addresses were from Fonterra Head Office in Auckland. 
 
The second set of eight exclusions was under section 9(2)(b)(2) of the Act citing ‘commercial in 
confidence’.  Apart from perhaps the specific remuneration paid to Professor Swinburn for his 
report, it is challenging to understand why a Food Safety Authority should be indulging in 
commercial discussions which are of a confidential nature. 
 
There were an additional 18 exclusions on the grounds that information was ‘patently not 
relevant’.  It is not clear on what legislative grounds these exclusions were made and it would 
seem that they were on the judgement of Policy Director Carole Inkster (who was herself the 
central NZFSA figure in relation to the Swinburn Report).  Given that the topic of the 
communications were indeed A1/A2, it is difficult to understand the legitimacy of these 
exclusions.  One particular document (Briefing No 03/639) of 20 April 2004 had all of the first 
page excised except for the following headings; Background, Scientific Update, Market 
Developments, and Media Interest.  It is indeed disturbing to see a Food Safety Authority 
providing briefings which include market considerations and even more disturbing when these 
communications are withheld.   
 
If all documents had been supplied in response to this OIA request then there should have been 
no additional documents in the material previously supplied to NZ Farmers Weekly in March 
2004, and relating to the 2003/4 period.  However, this was not the case.  For example, the 
material included in this report from Carole Inkster to Professor Boyd Swinburn about the 
NZFSA strategy in ‘trickling out’ with the terms of reference, was not included in the 2007 
request.  Similarly, a letter from Carol Barnao of 12 August 2004 to the author of this report 
(Woodford) was not included.  This raises grave concerns as to what other information might 
remain undisclosed in NZFSA files. 
 
 
NZFSA’s Strategy 
 
The overall strategy was set out in a handwritten undated document by Carole Inkster.  It is clear 
from the contents that this was before the appointment of Professor Swinburn (which was 
                                                 
1 Correspondence dated 27 Sept 2007 to Keith Woodford from Policy Director Carole Inkster, apparently referring to 
herself in the third person. 
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underway in March 2003).  The document appears to have been written either in late January or 
early February 2003. 
 
The ‘strategy’ as set out was ‘to deal with maintaining drinking milk’.   
 
This particular strategy would seem surprising for a Food Safety Authority.  A more appropriate 
strategy would seem to have been to investigate the food safety issues and to communicate 
accordingly to Government and the populace in New Zealand.  In contrast, the strategy of 
‘maintaining drinking milk’ would indeed seem to be predetermining the stance and outcome. 
 
The strategic outcome (as set out in the document) is stated thus: ‘at the end, [we] can say we 
have checked’. However it is not clear whether this was the expected outcome, the hoped for 
outcome, or the required outcome, with any of these being a plausible interpretation. Once again, 
once can only express surprise at this strategic outcome being so narrowly described.  The 
apparent exclusion of the possibility of a food safety issue being identified would seem 
remarkable. 
 
The people at this meeting were ‘Steve’ and Carol B’, and the planning was to include ‘Lloyd at 
the next meeting’.   
 
The immediate plan also included to ‘click in with [deleted] etc about it not being dangerous’.  
The deleted person (deleted on privacy grounds) is presumably outside the NZFSA.  One can 
only surmise as to what organisation this person might belong to, why they needed to be ‘clicked 
into’ and why they might need privacy. 
 
 
Choice of Reviewer 
 
There was contention over the choice of reviewer.  Subsequent to Professor Swinburn being 
approached by NZFSA to conduct the review, A2 Corporation expressed strong disagreement 
based on apparently negative comments that had been made (and reported on TV) by Professor 
Swinburn about Professor Bob Elliott, (who had produced some of the key A2 research).  There 
was also some internal concern within NZFSA about the appointment (with some names of those 
making the comments deleted).  (Professor Swinburn was himself proactive and totally ‘upfront’ 
in alerting the NZFSA to his public comments.)  It is not clear where the initial nomination of 
Professor Swinburn came from, but it is evident that it was Carole Inkster who determined that 
Swinburn’s public comments should not disqualify him.   
 
 
Terms of Reference 
 
The terms of reference evolved over time, and were not finalised until Professor Swinburn had 
almost completed the report.  Early on there was debate as to the limits on the information to be 
assessed.   
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During March 2003 there was various internal correspondence between officers of NZFSA over 
the terms of reference.  However, it is also apparent that this correspondence involved people 
outside NZFSA whose names have been deleted.  There is no indication as to what organisations 
these people represented. 
 
On 5 May 2003 a communication from A2 Corporation requested that the terms of reference 
include ‘the literature on beta-casomorphin7 and metabolites which have opioid like (morphine 
like) effects and which can be derived from A1 and B beta-casein but not from A2 casein’.  In the 
same letter it was requested that the various patent applications (and hence the data within) from 
organisations such as the Dairy Board and A2 Corporation, and also unpublished documentation 
available from within Fonterra, be included in the review. 
 
There is no evidence of NZFSA responding to this particular letter.  Neither issue was included in 
the terms of reference. 
 
It was also pointed out in this 5 May 2003 letter from A2 Corporation that in NZ ‘we produce 
about 13 billion litres of milk [but in NZ] drink only 2.55% of that figure.  However 27-28% of 
the NZ cows are A2 and hence supplying A2 milk ‘is a relatively easy logistical problem’. This 
was relevant to some correspondence about this time between A2 Corporation and NZFSA 
whereby A2 Corporation believed that the NZFSA was characterising their position as ‘anti 
milk’.   
 
Internal correspondence within NZFSA about the terms of reference was still occurring on 22 
May 2003.  There was specific comment about whether or not a study investigating the effect of 
A1 and A2 beta-casein on heart disease parameters and undertaken at University of Queensland 
should be included.  At that time the paper had been accepted for publication in the international 
journal ‘Atherosclerosis’ but had not actually been published.  This study concluded that ‘A1 
beta casein is atherogenic [i.e. causes heart disease]’.  Internal NZFSA correspondence of 22 May 
2003 refers to this as the ‘infamous rabbit study’ and ‘the infamous Campbell report’.  It is 
puzzling as to why it should be described this way, although of course it was clearly a problem 
paper for those who wished to deny there were health issues associated with A1 beta-casein. 
 
On 23 May 2003 the Chairman of A2 Corporation wrote again to the NZFSA requesting input 
into the terms of reference to ensure that the ‘brief is full, rounded, and likely to lead to a truly 
independent and authoritative assessment of the present situation’.  The NZFSA replied on 16 
June saying that the contract has already been agreed by both parties [NZFSA and Swinburn]. 
 
In late May Carole Inkster advised Professor Swinburn that she hoped to ‘go out (trickle out) 
with a summary of the terms of reference’. 
 
However it was only on 17 July 2003 that Carole Inkster advised Professor Swinburn that she had 
signed the contract. 
 
It is apparent, however, that others had been given some opportunity to influence the terms of 
reference.  An internal email communication (29 April 2003) between ‘H’ and Carole Inkster 
stated that (s)he had a ‘phone message re terms of reference for the review by Boyd Swinburn 
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from [name deleted] Porter Novelli, Sydney.  It is not clear who Porter Novelli, a global public 
relations company, were representing. 
 
The final terms of reference were not clearly marked as such within the OIA documents.  Nor 
were they included in Professor Swinburn’s report.  The various draft terms of reference (one of 
which may have been the final version) are not specific as to whether the report should include 
investigations with animals, or whether the underlying science of beta-casomorphin should be 
explored.  In fact the report did include some animal studies (limited) but there was no material 
on the science of casomorphins. (By September 2007 the PubMed database includes 235 
published papers on casomorphins.) 
 
 
The Precautionary Principle 
 
There was ongoing discussion between Professor Swinburn and Carole Inkster as to the way 
various issues should be addressed.  In late April Cariole Inkster wrote in an email: 
‘In relation to discussion of the precautionary principle our preference would be to not 
discuss it as the precautionary principle – this term has all sorts of baggage associated with 
it (especially European baggage) and our preference is to refer to the way we treat 
uncertainty in scientific assessments and exercise caution in reaching risk management 
based positions.  Happy to expand on this if that would be useful.’ 
 
This communication raises important issues in relation to the way NZFSA was attempting to 
manage the situation.  The precautionary principle, when properly applied, states that when there 
is uncertainty, and where the cost of making a mistake is high, then one should err on the side of 
caution.  In essence, the precautionary principle says that one does not wait for final absolute 
proof before taking an issue seriously, in situations where there are large potential risks 
associated with ignoring that issue. 
 
 
The Initial Report 
 
Professor Swinburn’s initial report (before peer review) was submitted on17 July 2003.  It was 
not (and still has not been) made available.  Arguably, this is reasonable.  This is because the 
purpose of peer review is to try and avoid incorrect statements and it is not helpful to have a draft 
report still awaiting peer review in wide circulation.  However, it does appear that the two key 
commercial parties (A2 Corporation and Fonterra) may not have been treated equally.  I am 
advised by A2 Corporation’s CEO at that time (Dr Clarke) that they did not receive any 
information about the report until late July 2004.  However, there is an email from Fonterra dated 
13 October 2003 which says (with punctuation and spelling retained as in the original); 
 
Carole. you will recall that I mentioned that A2 is looking elsewhere to market its milk (see 
attached). 
 
 9
It is important that NZFSA keeps the momentum up on Boyd Swinburn’s report and that its 
decision on the merits of A2’s claims be published ASAP.  This will go a long way to 
providing an independent view to other food/health authorities off shore (including US 
FDA??) and also to those in the food and dairy industry who are likely to be facing the 
problems we have been facing here in NZ and Oz 
 
kind regards 
[blanked on privacy grounds] 
Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd. 
 
There are three issues raised by this communication.   
 
The first is the opening statement’ you will recall that I mentioned’.  If this previous 
communication was in written form then it should have been included in the OIA information.  
And if it was oral then this would seem to confirm a considerable level of informality in the 
communications (and hence close relationship) between Fonterra and the NZFSA. 
 
The second issue is the lobbying that is inherent in the communication and whether this is 
appropriate behaviour between a commercial company and a FSA. 
 
The third is that the communication is apparently based on some knowledge as to the contents of 
Professor Swinburn’s report.  How was this information obtained?  And why and how had 
Fonterra received this information, given that it was not supplied to A2 Corporation? 
 
 
The Peer Review Process 
 
An email from Fonterra on 18 November 2003 sets out eight potential reviewers of Boyd 
Swinburn’s report.  It is clear that this is email, which is simply headed ‘Names’, is in response to 
a request from NZFSA, but there is no documentation of that earlier communication.  It may have 
been oral. 
 
There is no evidence that A2 Corporation were asked to supply name of potential reviewers, and 
Dr Clarke, who was the CEO at A2 Corporation at the time has confirmed to me that they were 
not provided with this opportunity. 
 
It is clear from correspondence obtained from NZFSA that there was considerable difficulty in 
finding appropriate reviewers, with some potential reviewers being unavailable for various 
reasons.  In the end there were two reviewers from NZ, one from the UK and one from Iceland.  
It is obvious from the peer review documents that the peer reviewers varied considerably in 
regard to the effort they put into their review and their knowledge of the topic.  The Icelandic 
reviewer stood out in terms of providing critical but constructive comments.   
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Planning the Release of the Report 
 
An undated Draft Communication Plan states that the style was to be ‘Authoritative’. 
 
The first ‘key message’ was to be ‘there is no evidence that either milk poses a food safety issue’. 
 
A ‘Comms briefing kit’ was to be prepared for the media consisting of the ‘Report, FAQs, Media 
Release, Terms of Reference, and Short Background on Boyd and Reviewers’. 
 
Various stakeholders were to be given an embargoed report one week prior to release.  The 
organisations to receive such a copy would be; 
Ministry of Health, 
A2 Corporation,  
Fonterra,  
FSANZ, and 
the Commerce Commission. 
 
This was the first time (approx 26 July 2004) that A2 Corporation had seen the overall thrust of 
Professor Swinburn’s report.  They quickly replied to NZFSA, welcoming some aspects of the 
finding s but also expressing great concern about information that had been omitted.  Indeed they 
identified 39 research papers that they considered important but which Professor Swinburn had 
omitted. 
 
Carole Barnao replied that ‘We will send through your comments to Boyd but will be publishing 
the report as it is, with an opportunity for discussion possibly later in the month when Boyd will 
be in New Zealand’  One can only wonder whether this approach was consistent with getting a 
quality report. 
 
 
Release of the Report  
 
The report was released on August 3 2004 with an accompanying media package.  However, 
despite Carol Barnao having said to A2 Corporation a few days earlier that ‘We will be 
publishing the report as is’, a significant change had in fact occurred.  The Lay Summary had 
been removed.  In doing this, some unidentified person had changed the Layout of the technical 
Executive Summary to create very large (indeed extremely large) paragraph breaks so that the 
overall document retained its original length in terms of the number pf pages.  The motivation for 
this change, or indeed the decision to omit the lay Summary, is not recorded in any 
documentation released under OIA. 
 
The NZFSA press release of 3 August 2004 commenced: 
Consumers are advised to keep drinking milk as a nutritious food no matter whether it is 
A1 or A2, as there is no food safety issue with either type of milk’. 
 
Not surprisingly, it was this message that dominated media reports.   
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A key issue is whether or not this safety message was consistent with the report that Professor 
Swinburn had presented.   
 
A related key issue is whether or not the NZFSA could have sustained their position if 
Professor Swinburn had been available for media interviews.  It will be documented below that 
Professor Swinburn had in fact stated his unavailability to do interviews on the specific days 
surrounding 3 August, but his availability at other times. 
 
 
The Issue of the Lay Summary 
 
The Lay Summary was written by Professor Swinburn in response to a reviewer’s comment that 
such a report was needed.  This is explicit in information obtained under the OIA.  Professor 
Swinburn also made it explicit on Radio NZ National on 14 September that he was asked to 
provide this report.  However Carole Inkster was also explicit on Radio NZ National on that day 
that this was not part of the contract and this was why it was omitted  
 
The Lay Summary said inter alia: 
‘The A1/A2`hypothesis is both intriguing and potentially very important for population health if 
it is proved correct.  It should be taken seriously and further research is needed.’ 
 
‘Changing the dairy herds to more A2 producing cows may significantly improve human health.’ 
 
‘As a matter of individual choice, people may wish to reduce or remove A1 beta-casein from 
their diet(or their children’s diet) as a precautionary measure.  This may be particularly relevant 
for those individuals who have or are at risk of the diseases mentioned (type 1 diabetes, coronary 
heart disease, autism and schizophrenia).’ 
 
Indeed the overall tone of the Swinburn report was to emphasise the uncertainty.  As a 
consequence, Swinburn was clear that there were insufficient grounds for warnings to be placed 
on milk containing A1 beta-casein.  He was equally clear that there may be considerable benefits 
to some individuals by moving to A2 milk. 
 
 
Why was the Lay Summary Removed? 
 
It is remarkable that there was no internal or external correspondence released under the OIA 
which helps understand how the decision to omit the Lay Summary was made.  Indeed the 
existence of such a report would not have been known to the media if it were not for this author 
(Woodford) disclosing its existence.  Woodford became aware of the Lay Summary because of 
an A2 Corporation press release that mentioned a statement by Swinburn which was not in the 
released version of the report.  Woodford then obtained the original report from A2 Corporation 
and compared the documents. 
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The NZFSA has given contradictory reasons for the omission of the Lay Summary.   
 
The first approach was to essentially pretend that it did not exist.  Carole Inkster said on Radio 
NZ National: ‘There is nothing being held back.  The full text of the report is in the public arena.  
It is on our website.’  Then in response to a specific question from presenter Kevin Ikin as to 
whether it included the Lay Summary, she replied: ‘No, it doesn’t include the Lay Summary 
because we felt it didn’t add anything’.   
 
However, Carol Barnao, in subsequently (12 august 2004) releasing the Lay Summary under an 
OIA request to this author, stated in writing, that the Lay Summary was ‘not included in the final 
report, which was available on the website, as we feel that the tone is inconsistent with the main 
report.’  (It is notable that this letter was missing from the OIA documents released in Sept 2007.) 
 
Subsequently (Sept 2007), Carole Inkster has said on Radio NZ National that it was not released 
because it was not part of the contracted report.  Inkster  also stated to NZPA on 14 Sept 2007 
that: ‘What we do with the report that we commissioned is really our business’.   
 
In fact the Lay Summary was subsequently placed on the NZFSA website.  However, by this 
time the issue was ‘stale’ and it was not picked up by the news media. 
 
It can be noted that the tone of the Lay Summary was indeed somewhat different than the main 
report.  Swinburn explained this in a letter written jointly with the author of this report 
(Woodford) in an email letter to Fonterra CEO on 24Aughust 2004 and documented within 
‘Devil in the Milk”.  In essence the main report was aimed at Government and addressed the 
issue of whether or not there should be a warning on milk.  The Lay Summary focused on what 
ordinary people should do given the uncertainty.     
 
 
Subsequent Responses from Professor Swinburn 
 
Professor Swinburn wrote to NZFSA on 13 August expressing his disappointment at the way 
NZFSA had released his report.  He pointed out that it had been released at a time when he had 
previously advised he would be unavailable to take media calls.  He also said: 
 
‘The NZFSA spin turned out to be a rather classic government agency response of trying to 
paint it as a non issue with a degree of certainty it didn’t warrant.  That is why I had 
recommended a balanced communication from government about the uncertainty, and I 
suspect it is why the Lay Summary was pulled.’ 
 
Professor Swinburn was also critical of (‘amazed’ and ‘disappointed at’) [name deleted, but an 
easily identifiable nutrition scientist] who had weighed into the debate by arguing against the 
need for more research’ 
 
The NZFSA response from Carole Inkster included taking responsibility for ‘getting the 
availability of your dates wrong’.  However, the NZFSA also indicated that it was a considered 
decision not to wait until when they believed Professor Swinburn would be available in NZ, some 
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10days later, as ‘we had decided we did not want to delay release until later in August’.  It is 
indeed puzzling why a delay of a few days was so important to NZFSA given that there had 
already been more than 12 months delay since Professor Swinburn had first submitted his report 
for peer review. 
 
Carole Inkster’s response on 16 August 2004 also contained the following remarkable  comment 
in relation to Swinburn’s unavailability to the media. 
‘…we did not believe that [your unavailability] was a distraction in so far as the media 
were not able to engage on points of science unnecessarily and potentially beat up the 
issue.’ 
 
The debate between NZFSA and Swinburn continued, with Swinburn stating  
‘I think NZFSA could be subject to criticism if it is very definitive when the evidence is 
suggestive but not conclusive.  I think the media or others can and should debate the 
science.   
 
Swinburn continued: 
…if I had a child with Type 1 diabetes and was due to have another and I could easily 
obtain and afford A2 milk or formula, I would certainly use it for the next child because the 
cost/benefit is low because of the potentially very large benefit of preventing Type 1 
diabetes. 
 
Clearly these statements are inconsistent with the NZFSA key message that ‘there is no evidence 
that milk poses a food safety issue’. 
 
Swinburn also made his position very clear on Radio NZ National on 14 Sept 2007 that his non 
inclusion of terms such as ‘milk is safe’ was very purposeful.  
 
 
NZFSA’s ongoing position from 2004-2007 
 
Given the omitted evidence identified by A2 Corporation, the question immediately arose as to 
whether further updating was needed.  Professor Swinburn’s position was that if he were to do 
further updating work he wished to ‘stick with human data’.  This meant not looking at 
pharmacological data, such as the bizarre behaviour of rats when injected with beta casomorphin 
7.  For ethical reasons these types of trials are close to impossible to undertake in humans. 
 
Carol Barnao wrote to Carole Inkster that she ‘would also push for limiting [update work] to 
human studies –the complexity if we broaden the scope (and probably get hit with a retrospective 
consideration) is too difficult.’ 
 
Although there was discussion within NZFSA as to the desirability of contracting Professor 
Swinburn to maintain a watching brief, there was apparently no action taken to set up such a 
contract. 
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NZFSA Responses to Woodford’s book 
 
Woodford’s book ‘Devil in the Milk’, based on more than 100 papers published in the scientific 
literature, was published on 14Sept 2007.  Some media had advance ‘readers copies’ some days 
before.   
 
NZFSA’s immediate response by press release on 13 September was: ‘Recent media reports of 
issues with milk, based on a book release, are not backed by scientific evidence.’  The 
spokesperson then admitted in response to a question that no-one at NZFSA had sighted the 
book. 
 
NZFSA also stated (13 Sept 2007) that: ‘We are not aware of any new research from anywhere in 
the world, and can only conclude that the world’s medical researchers have not seen the A2 
hypothesis as a high priority for investigation.’ 
 
Subsequently, on 24 September 2007, the NZFSA stated in a press release that their ‘expert 
opinion’ [is] that milk, whether A1 or A2` remains safe to drink’.  This opinion was reached 
‘after careful consideration of Keith Woodford’s book’. 
 
 
NZFSA and FSANZ 
 
The relationship between NZFSA (NZ Food Safety Authority) and FSANZ (Food Standards 
Australia New Zealand) can be a source of confusion to those not closely involved.  The FSANZ 
is a joint Australia/New Zealand organisation that harmonises food regulations across the two 
countries.  In Australia the FSANZ regulations are implemented by state and territorial 
authorities and in NZ this implementation is undertaken by NZFSA. 
 
On 14 September 2007 FSANZ produced a new fact sheet on ‘A1 and A2 milk’.  It stated 
‘FSANZ recommends that milk should continue to be regarded as a safe and nutrition component 
of the diet for most people’.  This was the first time that FSANZ had qualified its nutritional 
advice by adding ‘for most people’. 
 
Reflections and Conclusions 
It is evident that NZFSA had a strategy prior to commencement of the Swinburn study which was 
to ‘maintain drinking milk’.  This was consistent with a range of NZFSA press releases on milk 
between 2002 and 2007 which emphasised that ‘all milk is safe’.   
 
The NZFSA sought a report from Professor Swinburn that was authoritative.  However, there was 
a fundamental flaw in the NZFSA approach because the expected outcome was essentially 
predetermined.   
 
The NZFSA then provided guidance to Professor Swinburn that the precautionary principle, as it 
is normally understood, was to be avoided. 
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It is notable that throughout the review process the relationship between NZFSA and Fonterra 
was informal and included input from Fonterra as to the process, as well as lobbying as to how 
the report should be used.  In contrast, the relationship with A2 Corporation was considerably 
more formal and it seems that A2Corporation were particularly unsuccessful in widening the 
scope of the review. 
 
Despite terms of reference that led to most of the science (biochemistry, pharmacology, and 
immunology) being excluded, together with exclusion of some animal-based research and data 
contained within patent applications, the report that Professor Swinburn produced did not  give a 
clear message that ‘milk was safe’.  Indeed Swinburn has been explicit that he purposefully 
avoided such a phrase.   
 
For NZFSA to then successfully communicate a message of certainty, two issues needed to be 
dealt with.  One was that the Lay Summary could not be released at the same time, because of the 
obvious contradiction between the NZFSA ’key message’ of certainty and Swinburn’s key 
message of uncertainty. The second was that it would be counterproductive to have Swinburn 
available to talk to the media at the time the report was released, because his message of 
uncertainty, which would have been elicited by media questions, was in obvious conflict to that 
key message. 
 
The decision making processes that led to the exclusion of the Lay Summary and the release of 
the report at a time when Professor Swinburn had said he was not available, remain opaque.  In 
regard to omission of the Lay Summary it is, however, totally clear that NZFSA has made 
contradictory statements.  What is not clear is which statement is true.  In this regard, Carol 
Barnao’s written statement that it was not included in the final report ‘as we feel that the tone is 
inconsistent with the substantive report is illuminating.   There was indeed a difference in tone 
between the substantive technical report and the Lay Summary, and it arose from the difference 
in the audiences.  In the technical report Swinburn was addressing the issue of whether ‘ordinary 
milk’ should have a health warning on it and he was clear that the level of uncertainty was far too 
high for such an action.  However, in the Lay Summary he was speaking to ordinary people about 
the measures they might wish to take as individuals given that level of uncertainty.   
 
It is unfortunate that the reasons for these differences in tone were not made more explicit within 
the Swinburn report itself.  However, Swinburn did make it clear to NZFSA in the days following 
the report that their key message did not have his support.  (This was also made explicit in a joint 
letter written by Professor Swinburn and the author of this report (Woodford) in a letter to 
Fonterra CEO on 19 August 2004 and documented in Woodford’s book ‘Devil in the Milk’) 
 
It is notable that NZFSA did nothing to subsequently bring their ‘key message’ in line with 
Professor Swinburn’s position.  Despite him pointing out his findings had been incorrectly 
communicated by them, they simply re-asserted their previous position. 
 
The response to Woodford’s book proved further clear evidence of NZFSA being ‘bunkered 
down’ and in a state of denial.  How was it possible for NZFSA to state in a press release on 13 
September 2007 that ‘media reports of issues with milk, based on a book release, are not backed 
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by scientific evidence’ when they also admitted that they had at that time not seen the book?  
NZFSA also said that ‘We understand that this new book…is not presenting new science but is 
continuing to consider the material that was available to Professor Swinburn’.  The reality was 
that Professor Swinburn considered 38 papers whereas Woodford’s book considers more than 
100.   
 
Quiet simply, the approach of the NZFSA has been one of sustained misinformation. The 
outcome has been a major failure to objectively assess food safety issues for at-risk individuals.  
 
One can only surmise as to the motivations that have led to the NZFSA behaviours, and whether 
they arise from incompetence or something else.  It would seen that at an early stage NZFSA 
chose to characterise the A2 issue as an attack on milk in general , rather than an opportunity to 
deal with some particular problems that were solvable through animal breeding.  It may be that 
NZFSA did not appreciate that there were in the order of one millionA2 cows in NZ, that no 
company can own the A2 gene, and that any farmer can produce and any company can sell milk 
that is free of A1 beta-casein. 
 
The A1/A2 saga also highlights generic issues as to whether the structure and culture within 
NZFSA is fundamentally flawed.  According to NZFSA’s own website;  
‘The New Zealand Food Safety Authority has two key functions:  
-to protect and promote public health and safety 
-to facilitate market access for New Zealand’s food and food-related products.’ 
This structure makes it very easy for NZFSA to have a confused mandate.   
 
 
***** 
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